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Abstract 
The practice of having PhDs employed by the university that trained them, commonly called "academic 
inbreeding" has long been assumed to have a damaging effect on scholarly practices and achievement. 
Despite this perception, existing work on academic inbreeding is scarce and mostly descriptive or 
speculative. In this research we show, first, that academic inbreeding can be damaging to scholarly 
output. Our estimates suggest that academically inbred faculty generate on average 15% less peer 
reviewed publications than their non-inbred counterparts. Second, academically inbred faculty are more 
centered in their own institution and less open to the rest of the scientific world. In particular, we 
estimate that they are about 40% less likely to exchange information of critical relevance to their 
scholarly work with external colleagues. Third, academic inbreeding appears to be detrimental to 
scientific output even in leading research universities. Overall, our analysis implies that administrators 
and policy makers aiming to develop a thriving research environment in universities should seriously 
consider mechanisms to limit this practice. It also explores the role, importance and mechanisms by 
which outsiders contribute to create a dynamic and creative environment in knowledge intensive settings. 
 
1. Introduction 
At the beginning of the 20
th century, it was common to find a large proportion of the faculty in 
major US land grant universities (McNeely, 1932) and in Ivy League institutions (Handschin, 1910) who 
                                                      
1  Centro de Estudos em Inovação, Tecnologia e Políticas de Desenvolvimento, Instituto Superior Técnico, 1049-001 Lisboa, Portugal and 
Department of Engineering and Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh PA 15213, USA 
2 Department of Engineering and Public Policy, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh PA 15213, USA and FCEE, Universidade Católica 
Portuguesa, 1649-023 Lisbon, Portugal. 
* The first two authors contributed equally to this work. 
3  Área de Sociología de las Universidades. Departmento de Sociología, División de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades, Universidad Autónoma 
Metropolitana de Azcapotzalco. Av. San  Pablo # 180, Col. Reynosa Tamaulipas, Delegación Azcapotzalco, CP  022000,  México, D.F. México - 2 - 
had completed their PhD at the university where they were subsequently employed as faculty. This 
practice, commonly called "academic inbreeding" continues today in some US schools, especially the 
most prestigious ones (Burris, 2004). For example, the proportion of inbred entry level faculty at the 
Harvard Law School is 81%, and at the Yale Law School is 73% (Eisenberg and Wells, 2000). However, 
currently in the US, levels of academic inbreeding in universities are typically less than 20% and often 
below 10%. A similar situation is reported for other countries with developed scientific systems such as in 
the United Kingdom (Navarro and Rivero, 2001).But inbreeding is seen in many countries as “business as 
usual”, especially those with emergent scientific systems. Estimates suggest that academic inbreeding in 
Spain is as high as 95% (Navarro, A. Rivero, 2001); in Portugal it is 80% (Heitor and Horta, 2004). High 
rates have also been reported at French (Navarro and Rivero, 2001), Swedish (Bleiklie and Hostaker, 
2004), Russian (Smolentseva, 2003), Mexican (Santibañez et al., 2005), Korean (Johnsrud, 1993), 
Chinese (Yimin and Lei, 2003) and Japanese national universities (Yamanoi, 2005).Furthermore, 
although measures to tackle this issue are being considered in some regions (e.g.: Bosch, 2006), they 
often generate fierce resistance (e.g. see Yimin and Lei, 2003)  
Academic inbreeding has long been assumed to have a damaging effect on scholarly practices and 
achievement because it gives rise to academic parochialism (Berelson, 1960; Pelz and Andrews, 1966). 
But, despite this perception, research on inbreeding is scarce and existing work tends to be descriptive or 
exploratory, typically relying in univariate methods (Soler 2001, Wyer and Conrad 1984, Hargens and 
Farr’s 1973, McGee 1960). Yet, a growing presence of inbreeding environments, sometimes extreme, has 
raised critical questions as to the impact of this practice on universities (Navarro and Rivero, 2001; Soler, 
2001) and, consequently in the development of innovation systems around the world.  
A proper understanding of the impact of academic inbreeding is of direct interest to university 
administrators and policy makers in the area of science, technology and higher education. But the 
relevance is far more reaching. Universities have long been seen as central elements of a national 
innovation system and fundamental pillars in a knowledge based economy (Nelson 1993; Rosenberg and 
Nelson, 1994). The university research function in particular is of direct relevance for local industry - 3 - 
innovation (e.g.: Henderson et al., 1998). For instance, Jaffe (1989) finds a positive relationship between 
university research expenditures and local patenting rates (see also Acs et al., 1992) while Nelson (1993) 
shows how countries with the strongest firms in several high tech sectors, had equally solid university 
research. More recent results have confirmed and expanded this notion. Among others, Spencer (2001) 
compares Japan and the US, confirming the importance of local university research output to the technical 
advance of domestic firms, while Zucker et al. (2006) show that the local presence of US stars scientists 
has a large positive effect on new firm entry in the same technology area. Furman and MacGarvie (2007) 
demonstrate that the growth of industrial pharmaceutical laboratories was driven by the extent of local 
university research. Thus, a negative impact of academic inbreeding in university research output and 
quality, will also be playing a critical limiting the role on scientific and economic outcomes of the region. 
Studying the impact of academic inbreeding in scholarly practices is also relevant to further our 
understanding of the role of individual mobility in processes of knowledge generation in research 
environments. A budding literature in this topic suggests that hiring external researchers into existing 
environments is important for the ability of organizations to generate and access new knowledge. For 
example, Song et al. (2003) show that researcher mobility is more likely to result in interfirm knowledge 
transfer; Lacetera et al (2004) demonstrate that hiring star scientists can reshape the direction of research 
organizations. Looking at academic inbreeding helps reflect on what may happen to practices and 
outcomes of scientists that never change their research environment, as compared to those that are mobile.  
The paper assesses the impact of academic inbreeding on scholarly practices and achievement by 
carefully analyzing detailed data on Mexican scientists, their characteristics, behaviors and outputs. 
Mexico's scientific system is particularly suitable to study the effects of academic inbreeding because its 
size, diversity and level of development make it a reasonable representative of many other emerging 
nations around the world (Veloso et al., 2006). In addition, there is sufficient academic inbreeding to 
support a statistical analysis (see also Santibañez et al., 2005). The paper is organized as follows. The 
next section reviews the critical literature and presents the key hypothesis to be tested. Section 3 describes 
the data and empirical models to be used. Section 4 presents the results and section 5 concludes.  - 4 - 
2. Literature and Hypotheses 
In the beginning of the 20
th century academic inbreeding was current in the United States, even in 
preeminent universities. Its potential dire effects were then already noted. The president of Harvard, 
Charles W. Eliot alerted that inbreeding presented “grave dangers for a university” (1908: 90) in a time 
when 64% of the university faculty were own graduates. Historical studies suggest that even then, inbred 
faculty had lesser recognition, both academic and economic, as well as lower levels of achievement and 
promotion when compared to non-inbreds (Eells and Cleveland, 1999; Reeves et al., 1933).  
Existing research identifies two critical notions associated to the potential negative impacts of 
academic inbreeding, which were clearly established by Pelz and Andrews (1966) in their important 
sociological study of scientists. First, Pelz and Andrews (1966) stated that the main question of 
inbreeding rests on the idea that inbred faculty are less creative, independent, connected and original than 
non-inbred faculty. They argued in particular that inbreeding is associated with an exchange of scholarly 
information that favors internal sources over external contacts with other educational, scientific and 
societal institutions. The underlying statements of the authors imply a mechanism as well as a concern 
associated with academic renewal and adaptation to the evolution of knowledge. During their training, 
PhD students mainly assimilate the knowledge and learning environment of their institution, which they 
will largely use to inform future students when they become faculty (McNeely, 1932). Thus, when 
universities hire their own PhDs, there will be an overemphasis on the reproduction of locally learned 
knowledge, practices, as well as a consolidation of social structures in the organization. This may slow or 
block new or alternative approaches to the creation of institutional knowledge, limiting institutional 
change and ultimately contributing for the ossification of the organization (European Commission, 1995) 
This notion is consistent with known processes of learning and socialization in organizations. 
Existing work suggests that search processes in knowledge intensive environments tends to be path 
dependent and localized (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Stuart and Poldony, 1996; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 
2001; Singh, 2005), while hiring of external researchers can open the organization to new knowledge 
(Song et al., 2003) and even entire new research directions (Lecetera et al., 2004). Moreover, it has also - 5 - 
been shown that, as individuals are integrated in an organization, they become reproducers of the ideals of 
organizational culture (Frans et al., 1999). While this socialization process permits an efficient use of 
knowledge, it may also constrain its scope and flexibility (Camerer and Vepsalainen, 1988). In extreme 
situations, it can originate the establishment of ‘mental prisons’ that impede change or slow it in favor of 
organizational and knowledge inertia (Leeuw and Volberda, 1996). This perspective matches precisely 
the concern expressed by Pelz and Andrews (1966). 
Qualitative studies in the specific context of the university completed since Pelz and Andrews’ 
work lend support to this notion. For example, in a study of Brazilian agricultural scientists, Velho and 
Krige (1984) suggest that a strong inbreeding trend is associated to low levels of communication between 
scientists, as well as to preferences to interact with institution colleagues rather than with colleagues from 
other universities and R&D units. Therefore, the first critical hypothesis is: 
H1 - Information exchange hypothesis: “Inbred faculty more likely to exchange scholarly related 
information inside the university than non-inbred faculty” 
The second critical notion of the literature, also articulated by Pelz and Andrews (1966), is that 
academically inbred faculty and their practices would ultimately lead to inferior scientific output when 
compared to non-inbred faculty. To understand why this might be the case, it is important to note that the 
generation of new knowledge in a university relies extensively on the creativity of the researchers. This 
requires ever more frequently the combination of a pool of existing and emergent knowledge (See Kogut 
and Zander, 1992; Fleming and Sorenson, 2004). The opportunities for knowledge combination are 
conditioned by a number of factors, including organization experience, expertise and frequency in 
exchanging information and knowledge (Nelson and Winter, 1982). The knowledge production process is 
also path dependent (Nelson and Winter, 1982) and strongly influenced by embedded and stable 
organizational routines (Baum et al., 2000). When a university mainly hires its own graduates, existing 
socially accepted programs of action are further consolidated. If these give lesser importance to external 
knowledge (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Stuart and Poldony, 1996) and to the demands of an increasing - 6 - 
complex and fast evolving knowledge (Nowotny et al., 2001) then, as noted above, they may constrain the 
scope and flexibility of an organization (Camerer and Vepsalainen, 1988) and lead to knowledge inertia 
(Leslie and Fretwell, 1996). This will ultimately be reflected in the output and quality of the research 
work (Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001) 
This idea is consistent with the perspective that that openness and collaboration are of critical 
importance in the current research environment (Adams et al. 2005). These critical connections with 
outside sources of knowledge need to be searched, created and nurtured. Building up such external links 
takes time and effort because, among others, it us critical to establish trust within the networks to make 
them work (Levin and Cross, 2004). If inbreeding shunts these efforts, it will eventually have a 
detrimental effect in research performance. Velho and Krige’s (1984) study noted above suggests 
precisely that inbreeding and its practices are the main reason for Brazilian agricultural science to lag 
behind the leading edge international research in the field. Related work points to the same concept. 
Pieper and Willis (1999) argue that a very high concentration of PhD origins of economists led to 
increasing inbreeding in the profession, as well as to a lesser innovative thinking and creativity in the 
field. Soler’s (2001) analysis of 51 ecology or zoology departments around Europe finds a negative 
correlation between scientific productivity and inbreeding. Thus, the second hypothesis is: 
H2 - Productivity hypothesis: ”Inbred faculty produce fewer scholarly outputs than non-inbred faculty” 
A related perspective on the impact of academic inbreeding is the possibility for heterogeneity 
across institutions to mediate the impact of such practices on productivity. Berelson (1960) stated that 
major research oriented universities always had a greater percentage of inbred percentage because of their 
almost monopolistic position as producers of doctorates. A number of studies have shown this to be a 
consistent phenomenon across countries (e.g.: Yamanoi, 2005 for Japan; Santibañez et al., 2005 for 
Mexico; Hagstrom, 1971, Burris, 2004 and Merritt and Reskin, 1997, for the USA). Yet, Berelson (1960) 
also suggested that inbreeding processes at these universities could be different from other schools, for 
example those focusing more on teaching, because of the specific organizational environment. First, 
inbred faculty in top research schools would be hired, not because of the familiarity and ties with the - 7 - 
university they gained during the PhD, but rather because they were considered as the best resource to 
maintain the eminent scholarly status of the university (Berelson, 1960). Second, organizational culture in 
these major research oriented universities is also different. Hagstrom (1971) suggests research oriented 
departments (or universities) may be less affected by the potential negative impact of inbreeding on 
research productivity because they tend to be more ‘cosmopolitan’. This feature highlighted by Hagstrom 
(1971) refers the relevance of social capital and specifically the importance of interaction with others as a 
form to articulate and foster the development of existing knowledge (Nahapiet and Goshal, 1998). 
Research requires collaboration with colleagues outside the institution to maximize resources, achieve 
critical mass or find complementary skills (Thornsteinsdottir, 2000), aspects that have become ever more 
relevant in the last decades (Adams et al., 2005). As a result, during the course of their graduate studies as 
well as during their academic career, inbred faculty in leading research schools would be exposed to an 
environment with greater quality, openness, collaboration and diversity in terms of ideas and practices 
which can minimize the negative effects of inbreeding. The third hypothesis is then:  
H3 - Leading research oriented university hypothesis: “The negative effects of academic inbreeding on 
scholarly practices and output is mitigated in leading research oriented universities” 
This hypothesis was investigated by Hargens and Farr (1973). Their findings suggest that inbred 
faculty produce fewer articles than their non-inbred colleagues at research-oriented universities and they 
do not surpass non-inbred faculty in less prestigious universities. Yet, the test had a number of limitations, 
including a very limited number of control variables, the use of data from American Men of Science (that 
tends to focus on distinguishable and notable scientists, thus, providing a skewed characterization of the 
scientist of the overall system), and also the use of faculty members only from natural sciences (e.g.: 
math, physics and chemistry). Precisely due to the limitations of Hargens and Farr’s (1973) study, Wyer 
and Conrad (1984) further examined the relationship between institutional origin and productivity for the 
1977 survey of the American Professoriate, encompassing 160 institutions from all major academic 
disciplines. They find that inbred faculty produced more than non-inbred faculty. However, the analysis - 8 - 
again has a number of limitations. First, the authors do not isolate ‘silver-corded’ and continuous 
inbreeding (see methods of this paper below). Second, the work is based on a discriminatory analysis that 
compares between critical variables for inbred faculty vs a non-inbred faculty, with the corrections for 
experience done on the dependent variable and no controls for heterogeneity across areas and institutions.  
3. Methods and data 
3.1 Data Source and Characteristics 
The dataset used in this study was generated through a survey conducted to analyze the impact of 
public policies in processes of institutional change within Mexican higher education institutions. The 
questionnaire, sponsored by CONACYT, the Mexican Science and Technology Foundation and directed 
by one of the authors, focused on the academic profession. It included questions on demographics, career 
mobility, work experience, work conditions, work satisfaction levels, academic socialization, including 
forms of interaction in the context of working activities, and scholarly results between 1999 and 2002, for 
all scientific areas and most institutions in the Mexican Higher Education System. The original dataset 
that resulted from this questionnaire is composed by 3861 faculty members of all scientific fields from 64 
higher education institutions of the Mexican higher education system.  
Given the purpose of our analysis, this dataset was filtered using three requirements. The first 
requirement was to include only faculty holding a PhD. The Doctorate degree is usually considered as the 
degree that enables an individual to start a scientific career (Golde and Doré, 2001). Moreover, this was 
critical for our analysis since, following the literature (e.g.: Berelson, 1960), the location of the PhD will 
become the critical sorting variable to distinguish inbred from non-inbred faculty. The second 
requirement was that only higher education institutions that granted doctoral degrees could be analyzed. 
This restriction is required because, if an institution could not grant doctoral degrees and the doctoral 
degree is the minimal academic requirement for our analysis, then all faculty in those institutions would 
be necessarily non-inbred. Finally the third requirement was that only institutions with both inbred and 
non-inbred faculty members were included. As explained below, the analyses look at the effects of 
inbreeding by disciplinary field and institution. Thus, by construction, higher education institutions - 9 - 
without inbred faculty cannot be used in the analysis. After the filtering process, the database used in our 
study includes 414 academics in 14 higher education institutions.  
In our analysis, we use the concept of faculty inbreeding proposed by Berelson (1960). This 
concept considers an academic to be inbred when he or she was first hired and developed the career in the 
very same higher education institution where his or her doctoral degree was obtained. In the database we 
constructed the inbreeding variable by crossing information from three questions in the original survey: 
one that asked in which institution the PhD was obtained; another that asked in which institution did the 
academic career started; and a third that asked in which institution is the academic currently based. 
Crossing the answers from these three questions minimizes the possibility of mistakenly categorizing as 
inbred faculty those holding a PhD from the same institution where they currently work but that have 
previously held a position in another school
4. These are referred to in the literature as “silver cord” 
(Berelson, 1960) and they are sometimes used mistakenly in the literature as faculty inbreeds. It is 
important to indentify this group because previous studies indicate that silver-corded academics tend to be 
scholarly superior (Caplow and McGee, 1958; Calhoun et al., 1990). Thus, their categorization as 
inbreeds can bias the results an analysis
5. Given this characterization, academically inbred faculty 
represent 26% of our sample, albeit with strong variation across institutions and areas of knowledge. 
3.2. Data: Academic Output Measures 
Two critical notions are being considered for analysis. The first relates to which colleagues and 
institutions are privileged by inbred and non-inbred faculty as sources to exchange information related to 
their scientific activities. In the survey, information exchange practices included 5 categories: information 
exchange about research and teaching activities, information exchange about innovative subjects and 
                                                      
4 Researcher mobility in Mexico is very small. Therefore it is highly unlikely to have cases that start as 
inbred faculty, then leave to another school and finally return to their alma mater.  
5 E.g. Long et al. (1993) found that the effect of inbreeding on promotion was not significant. Yet, they did 
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articles, information exchange about equipment and research techniques, information exchange about 
financial sources for research, information exchange about publishing and diffusion of research results, 
and information exchange about job vacancies. For each of these categories, the survey asked the 
academic what was his or her level of intensity in information exchange for two internal locations and 
two external locations. The two internal locations were the research group to which the academic 
belonged and other academics within the university. The two external locations were academics and 
institutions from other national institutions and academics and institutions from institutions outside the 
Mexican science and higher education system. The information exchange intensity for all locations was 
reported by academics at four levels: never, rarely, sometimes and frequently (coded from 1 to 4).  
To assess if faculty favored information exchange inside or outside the university where they 
currently work, we created a binary variable which is the result of a comparison of the answers regarding 
the two internal locations with those obtained for the two external locations. First, the two internal 
locations were combined into one score of information exchange intensity within the university by adding 
the scores for the two individual answers. The answers to the two external locations were similarly 
combined into one score of intensity of information exchange outside the university. Second, we establish 
the binary variable that signals whether external sources for information exchange are favored over 
internal ones by comparing the combined internal and external scores. If the external information 
exchange intensity score is greater than the internal one, then the binary variable takes the value of 1; 
otherwise it takes the value of 0.  For example, if an academic responded that she frequently (4) 
exchanged information with her research group colleagues and frequently (4) exchanged information with 
her university colleagues and sometimes (3) exchanged information with other national colleagues and 
frequently (4) exchanged information with academics in international institutions. Then we consider that, 
although this academic exchanged information frequently inside and outside his or her institution, she still 
privileged internal information exchange and thus the binary value would be zero (internal is favored): 
Internal:  (research group) 4 + (own university) 4 = 8 which is greater than 
External: (other national colleagues) 3 + (international colleagues) 4 = 7 - 11 - 
However, whenever the sum of internal and external scores is equal, then high frequency is used 
as an additional parameter to determine orientation. A frequent exchange of scientific information is more 
valued than an exchange of information that happens only sometimes because it assumes stronger ties and 
a much more active and engaging participation with colleagues in a specific context. So, in the following 
example, it would be considered that the academic privileged exchanging information with colleagues 
outside the university (the binary value would be one) due to the presence of a frequent collaboration 
assessment on the external side, even though the overall score is the same:  
Internal:  (research group) 3 + (own university) 3 = 6 which is the same as  
External: (other national colleagues) 4 + (international colleagues) 2 = 6 
In some cases, there was no difference in the preference between internal and external intensity of 
information exchange for the academic, even with the frequency rule described in the paragraph above. 
These cases occurred when the intensity of information exchanged was reported to be the same for all 
sources (e.g.: all information exchange were reported as frequently) or when the score for internal and 
external sources was the same and symmetrical (e.g.: internal 5=3+2 vs. external 5=3+2). In the base 
analysis reported in the article, we did not consider these cases in the estimation. This explains the 
varying number of cases observed across the different information exchange categories (see Table 1)
6.  
The descriptive statistics for the resulting information exchange variables are presented in upper 
rows of Table 1 below. As it can be observed, faculty favors internal exchange of information over 
external exchanges across all variables, which is reasonable. There is evidence that knowledge is 
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information exchange scores were assumed to be favoring internal sources (zero in our binary variable) or the 
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localized (e.g.: Velho and Krige, 1984 for universities; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003 for firms), which is 
consisted with the idea that faculty talk more often to their colleagues than with those outside the school.  
Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent variables used in estimation 
INFORMATION EXCHANGE  Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Share of faculty that favors information exchange outside own 
university in what concerns:         
Innovative subjects and articles in your field   315 0.25  0.43  0  1 
Publishing and diffusion research results  300 0.27  0.44  0  1 
Research and teaching activities   340 0.16  0.37  0  1 
Equipment sources and research techniques   306 0.23  0.42  0  1 
Financial sources for research   296 0.21  0.41  0  1 
Job opportunities   278 0.24  0.43  0  1 
         
SCIENTIFIC OUTPUTS         
Number of articles in peer reviews journals  409 2.82  2.28  0  9 
Number of consulting contracts (Government or private)  409 0.28  0.93  0  7 
Number of prototypes and patents  409 0.12  0.52  0  6 
Number of undergraduate thesis supervised  409 1.99  2.17  0  9 
Number of master thesis supervised  409 1.41  1.54  0  6 
Number of PhD thesis supervised  409 0.65  1.05  0  4 
Note: All the values refer to totals for years 1999-2002.  
The other notion explored in article relates to the performance of inbred and non-inbred faculty in 
what concerns the generation of scholarly outputs. The outputs considered in our analysis include the 
major functions associated with the mission of the university – teaching, research and outreach. The data 
for these variables is obtained directly from the questionnaire that asks each academic his or her output 
along each of the relevant dimensions between 1999 and 2002. Descriptive statistics are presented in the 
lower rows of Table 1 above. The variables associated with teaching are the number of thesis at 
undergraduate, master and PhD level supervised by the faculty (although at PhD level the output 
represents to a certain extent a mix between teaching and research). To characterize outreach work we use 
the number of consulting contracts and as well as the numbers of prototypes and patents
7. We believe 
these two variables can cover a very broad range of outreach activities, from dispensing advice to firms 
and the government, more typical in social sciences and likely to be labeled as consultancy projects, to 
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technical subcontracts, often in the physical sciences and engineering, which may not be seen as 
consultancy but are likely to entail developing physical prototypes for a client. Research output is 
assessed using the number of articles in scientific peer reviewed journals. This measure of output is an 
established metric typically used in studies of scientific productivity (e.g. Wyer and Conrad, 1984; Levin 
and Stephan, 1991; Adams et al. 2005; Gonzalez-Brambila and Veloso, 2007). However, it also has 
limitations. First, journals may vary in quality. Thus, while controlling for journal quality would be a 
good refinement of our analysis, such data was not available in the instrument used for this research.  
Second, we are not covering other scholarly outputs of research, such as books and conference papers. 
Yet, these tend to be less consistent in nature and quality than peer reviewed journals and thus even more 
noisy measures of output than the one we are considering (Lewison, 2001).  
3.3 Data: Control variables 
In addition to the critical performance variables, the proposed assessment (see below for a 
detailed description of the methods used in the estimations) requires an important set of control variables. 
The objective is to make sure that we, when we estimate the impact of inbreeding on information 
exchange or scientific output, we do not wrongly attribute to inbreeding other factors that also likely to 
correlate with information exchange practices or scientific output. These control variables were 
determined based on previous literature related to research productivity in scientific and higher education 
systems (e.g.: Gonzalez-Brambila and Veloso, 2007; Levin and Stephan, 1991). Summary statistics for 
the relevant control variables are presented in Table 2 (a correlation table A1 is presented in appendix).  
The first control variable considered in our analysis is years since first job in academia. This 
controls for the experience of single faculty in academia and scientific system. Time is a very important 
variable in academia because it is associated with scientific and academic working experience and 
refinement of skills as well as with the integration into social networks both at organizational and 
systemic levels. The average experience of the faculty in the sample is 20 years. It is relevant to note that, 
in line with previous literature (see Gonzalez-Brambila and Veloso, 2007; Levin and Stephan, 1991), 
years in academia will be considered with a linear as well as a quadratic term. - 14 - 
Table 2 – descriptive statistics - independent variables 
Variables Obs  Mean  Std. 
Dev.  Min  Max 
Years since first job in academia  414 20.51  9.86  1  48 
Years since first job in academia squared  414 517.8  425.6  1 2304 
Male  414 0.63  0.48  0  1 
Conduct/participate collective R&D project  413 0.77  0.42  0  1 
Had funding to developed R&D in the last 3 years  369 0.80  0.40  0  1 
Teaches graduate students only  414 0.05  0.22  0  1 
Teaches undergraduate students only  414 0.24  0.42  0  1 
Average number of students per class  409 23.17  12.53  0  60 
Inbreeding  414 0.26  0.44  0  1 
The second variable considered as a control is gender, which accounts for known differences in 
research productivity between genders. As it can be seen in Table 2, 63% of our sample are men. The 
third variable we considered is participation in collective R&D projects. This aims to control for the 
overall extent of integration and engagement of the faculty in scientific networks dealing with research. 
As it can be seen in Table 2, most faculty (77%) participates these type of projects. Still related to 
engagement in research activities, we also control for whether the faculty member received funding in the 
previous 3 years to support R&D projects (80% have received). This controls for heterogeneity in the 
availability of resources that support the generation of research outputs
8. 
The variables teaching to undergraduate only (24%), teaching to graduate only (5%) or teaching 
to both undergraduate and graduate programs (the baseline), and average number of students per class 
(23.2) control for the type and amount of teaching effort that the faculty is subject to. These features are 
important because the literature in research productivity suggests that there is a negative relationship 
between undergraduate teaching and research outputs (Marsh and Hattie, 2002). Also, the insertion of 
these control variables also take into account McGee’s (1960) study of the university of Texas findings, 
where it was identified that teaching loads were different between inbred and non-inbred faculty. Previous 
analyses of institutional inbreeding highlight the importance of considering these activities when studying 
the effects of inbreeding in scientific outputs (e.g.: Wyer and Conrad, 1984). 
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3.4 Methods used 
The estimation of the impact of inbreeding on information exchange practices relies on a 
multivariate probit regression model (see Wooldridge, 2001) based on: 
) ' ( ) 1 Pr( k j ijk ijk x Y δ α β + + Φ = =  
where the dependent variable is Yijk represents the information exchange for individual i in 
university j for scientific area k. Yijk = 0 if exchanges within the institution dominate and Yijk = 1 if 
exchanges outside are prevalent (see data description above on how the zero and one are determined). The 
independent variables (xijk) include a dummy signaling academic inbreeding (zero for non-inbreds and one 
for inbreds), as well as all the relevant controls described before: years since first job in academia as well 
as years squared, gender, availability of research funding, teaching duties (undergraduate, graduate or 
both) and number of students per class, institution and area of knowledge.  
In addition, as the equation above shows, there are fixed effects for institution (αj) and scientific 
area (δk). These are relevant controls because different institutions and areas of knowledge will be 
associated with important heterogeneity in scientific performance and information exchange practices for 
both inbred and non-inbreds. For example, it is likely that UNAM, a large and very well known 
institution attracts better people for its ranks, both inbreds and non-inbreds, when compared to a smaller 
regional university. If this were the case, results on the comparison of productivities across institutions 
could be entirely driven by unobserved differences between the institutions, rather than the differences 
between inbred and non-inbred faculty in each school. This could generate misleading results. . 
In deciding the scientific fields, we followed the differentiation proposed by ANUIES, the 
national association of higher education institutions on Mexico. The scientific fields considered in the 
estimation include natural sciences (it includes what is named in Mexico as “exact sciences”: 
mathematics, chemistry and physics), social and administration sciences, education and humanities, 
engineering and technology, health sciences and agrarian sciences.  
The estimation for the impact of inbreeding on academic output requires a procedure that can 
handle a dependent variable that is non-negative and based on counts. One alternative is to use a Poisson - 16 - 
regression. Yet, the problem is that the Poisson distribution restricts the variance of the dependent 
variable to be equal to the mean. Thus, the alternative approach that is typically considered is to perform 
an analysis using a negative binomial multivariate regression (see Wooldridge, 2001) based on:  
) ' ( ) ( k j ijk ijk ijk x F y Y P δ α β + + = =  
Where F is negative binomial distribution, Yijk is the scientific output of academic i in institution j 
and scientific field k,  Xijk are the independent variables that vary across faculty, scientific field and 
institution; ai are the institutional effects, δk: are the scientific field effects.  
4. Main Findings 
Table 4 presents the summary results for the research question on information exchange. The 
results provide a strong confirmation of the argument that inbred faculty collaborate and exchange less 
information outside their institutions and, as a result, are less integrated into national and international 
scholarly networks. Inbred faculty are roughly 40% less likely to exchange information with external 
colleagues in most information categories. For example, they are 52% less likely to exchange information 
about innovative subjects and articles with colleagues outside the university, 46% less likely to exchange 
information about research and teaching activities, as well as 43% less likely to exchange information 
outside in what concerns publishing and diffusion of research results when compared to non-inbred.  
Table 4 - Effect of academic inbreeding on likelihood of information exchange outside own school 
Probability of faculty to favor information 
exchange outside own university in what 
concerns: 
Sample 
Mean 
Inbred 
Effect 
Inbred Effect / 
Sample Mean 
Innovative subjects and articles  24.8%  -12.8%*** -52% 
Research and teaching activities  16.5%  -7.6%** -46% 
Publishing and diffusion of research results  27.0%  -11.6%*** -43% 
Equipment sources and research techniques  22.5%  -8.8%** -39% 
Financial sources for research  21.3%  -5.3%* -25% 
Job opportunities  24.5%  -3.7%  n.s. 
Note: n.s. – not significant; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Results are marginal effects obtained from regression estimation 
The ratio of the inbred effect over the sample is a direct algebraic estimation. Detailed regression results in appendix table A2. 
This lack of connectivity with the exterior of the university lends support to the view that that 
inbred faculty contribute to the organizational stagnation of knowledge. By favoring to internal scholarly 
information exchange, the university pool of knowledge is not steadily renewed and can eventually be - 17 - 
driven to exhaustion. The potential effect can be described by the words of Cohen and Levinthal’s: “If all 
actors in the organization share the same specialized language…they may not be able to tap into diverse 
external knowledge sources” (1990: 133). Since knowledge depreciates (Argote, 1999), a university with 
many inbred faculty will have a reduced flow of external knowledge, leading to an increasingly outdated 
knowledge, thus and making the university become ossified and less responsive to a fast evolving and 
challenging knowledge based society (see also Hoare, 1994). This is consistent with Pelz and Andrews 
(1966) argument that inbred faculty are less creative, independent and original.  
Table 3 - Effect of academic inbreeding on academic output 
Impact of academic inbreeding in academic 
output measured as: 
Sample 
Mean 
Inbred 
Effect 
Inbred Effect / 
Sample Mean 
Number of articles in peer reviews journals   2.82  -0.41** -15% 
Number of consulting contracts (Gov. or private)  0.28  0.13*** 46% 
Number of prototypes and patents  0.12  0.01*** 8% 
Number of undergraduate thesis supervised  1.99  -0.04  n.s. 
Number of master thesis supervised  1.41  -0.09  n.s. 
Number of PhD thesis supervised  0.65  0.03  n.s. 
Note:  n.s. – not significant; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Results on the table are marginal effects from regression 
estimation. The ratio of the inbred effect over the sample is a direct algebraic estimation. Regression results in appendix table A3. 
 
The analysis also confirms that academic inbreeding influences the various scholarly outputs. 
Table 3 summarizes the key results concerning the relation between inbreeding and scholarly outputs. 
Results show that academic inbreeding has no impact on the production of teaching outputs as no 
statistically significant differences are found for the teaching output variables. This does not necessarily 
mean that inbreeding does not have an impact on teaching and learning processes. Inbreeding may affect 
teaching practices, but if that effect exists, then it is not perceived through the number of thesis 
supervised. However, a statistically significant difference in research production is identified, with inbred 
faculty generating, on average, 15% fewer scientific papers than non-inbreds. This productivity gap 
persists across most areas of knowledge, albeit with different intensities as Figure 1 shows.  
Interestingly, the results on scientific productivity contrast with those concerned with the 
outreach mission of the university, which we proxy through the number of consultancy contracts as well 
as generation of prototypes and patents. Inbred faculty appear to be more involved in outreach activities, - 18 - 
generating 46% more consultancy contracts and 8% more prototypes and patents than their non-inbred 
peers. These results suggest that a ‘specialization’ trend’ between inbred and non-inbred faculty may be 
present. In a system with scarce resources, such as is the Mexican higher education system (Varela, 
2006), individuals may be directing their efforts strategically to activities that allows them to better 
mobilize resources, according to the capabilities and skills that they have (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). It 
is possible that non-inbred faculty are dedicating their resources and activity strategy to scientific 
activities and funding while inbred-faculty are relatively more devoted to consultancy and other non-
research work. Overall, the results confirm the perceived notion in the literature that academic inbreeding 
practices are detrimental for the production of scientific outputs. 
Figure 1 - Predicted values for faculty scientific output between 1999 and 2002 
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Note: Numbers reported are predicted values from the negative binomial regression model. 
Despite these results, as explained above, it is possible that inbreeding practices are moderated by 
the nature of the institution, such that in leading research oriented universities academic inbreeding would 
not be as damaging to scholarly activities. To test third hypothesis we look at the production of scholarly 
outputs for one of the largest and most prominent research university in Mexico: the Universidad 
Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM). In Table 5, we report the results comparing inbred and non-
inbred faculty at UNAM in terms of scholarly output. Results show that inbred faculty to produce fewer 
papers in reviewed journals when compared with their non-inbred colleagues. The effect nevertheless is - 19 - 
smaller than for the overall sample, on average less 6% peer reviewed publications
9. The trade-off with 
outreach activities appears to continue to exist, with mixed quantitative results: the dedication to 
consulting contracts is relatively larger for the UNAM sample when compared to the overall results but 
there are not enough observations on prototypes and patents to have a consistent estimation.  
Table 5 – Effect of inbreeding on scholarly academic output at UNAM 
Impact of academic inbreeding in academic 
output measured as: 
Sample 
Mean 
Inbred 
Effect 
Inbred Effect / 
Sample Mean 
Number of articles in peer reviews journals   3.03  -0.19* -6% 
Number of consulting contracts (Gov. or private)  0.41  0.29*** 70% 
Number of prototypes and patents (1)  --   --   --  
Number of undergraduate thesis supervised  2.08  -0.01  n.s. 
Number of master thesis supervised  1.53  -0.11  n.s. 
Number of PhD thesis supervised  0.87  0.16  n.s. 
Notes: n.s. – not significant; * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Results reported are marginal effects. Ratio of inbred effect over 
the sample is a direct algebraic estimation.  (1) Number of events is not enough to ensure the validity of the statistical model for 
the “Number of prototypes and patents” variable (Wald test not significative) Detailed regression results in appendix table A4 
 
These results support the third hypothesis and offer a partial confirmation of Berelson (1960) and 
Hagstrom’s (1971), suggestion of the ‘cosmopolitan’ effect in more research oriented universities. Yet, 
even if to a less extent, academic inbreeding is still detrimental to the production of scientific outputs. 
Inbreeding seems to be a good policy if the university wants to increase its outreach mission through 
consulting contracts. As Table 5 indicates, inbreds are clearly more engaged in consultancy activities than 
non-inbred faculty.  
5. Discussion 
The analysis shows that inbreeding has a detrimental effect on research productivity of academic 
institutions. Universities, as major centers of knowledge production and accumulation play a central role 
in the process of innovation and technological progress (Bok, 2003; Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994). 
                                                      
9 We assessed differences in information exchange practices for UNAM. But the Chi2 statistics for the 
regressions were mostly not significant. Results, although not significant, suggested no difference in information 
exchange practices between inbred and non-inbred faculty.  - 20 - 
Research, the activity most affected by inbreeding, it is exactly the one that brought the university from 
its previous role of transmitting status quo knowledge, to an organization that actively pursued new 
knowledge (Graham and Diamond, 1997). It was also the research function of the university that led the 
university to be engaged in multi-organizational frameworks of knowledge production, governance, 
transmission and even commercialization (Audretsch and Stephan, 1996; Jaffe 1989; Feldman et al., 
2002; Etzkowitz, 2003; Furman and MacGarvie, 2007). Thus, the negative impact of inbreeding on 
scientific output suggests far reaching implications for the competitiveness of a region. This is 
particularly important for countries still working to enhance their scientific base because universities 
represent an even more critical role as generators and processors of knowledge (Heitor and Horta, 2004). 
Besides demonstrating the negative impact that inbreeding can have on scientific outcomes, it is 
also important to note that an excessive focus on internal information sharing is a critical element 
associated with this outcome. Openness and linkages to external sources are as important for the 
university as for any other organization. They allow the organization to understand what are the rules of 
the game (North, 1990), but also to identify where are resources available (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) 
and, of special interest to our particular context, to know where and how to learn and accumulate 
knowledge from (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). The generation of new 
knowledge requires combining existing and emergent knowledge, with most of the latter existing outside 
the organization (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Fleming and Sorenson, 2004). Thus, favoring internal 
knowledge exchanges preserves the existing institutional culture and status quo, leading to intellectual 
and organizational inertia (Leslie and Fretwell, 1996). This will ultimately be reflected in the output and 
quality of the research work (Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001) 
A related perspective is to look at the inbreeding problematic in terms of the learning process of 
faculty members in universities and the application of new knowledge, methods and organizational 
frameworks while developing their scholarly activities. Organizations learn at different paces (Pisano et 
al., 2001) and, as noted in the paragraph above, access to information and networks is critical for 
knowledge producing organizations such as universities to generate their scholarly activities and scientific - 21 - 
outputs. Thus, inbreeding will make organizations learn at a slower pace and be less effective at analyzing 
their institutional environment. As a result, they become increasingly rigid and inertial, increasing the 
chances of not meeting its associated social goals and placing their social utility and perhaps even their 
legitimacy in jeopardy (Scott, 1995).  
In this context, it is important to relate the findings of this work to the literature underlining 
personnel mobility as beneficial for the generation of knowledge (e.g.: Gruenfled et al., 2000) and its 
transference (Almeida and Kogut, 1999). Consistent with Song et al. (2003) and Lacetera et al. (2004), 
our results suggest that hiring faculty and recent doctorates from other universities brings outside linkages 
that are associated to new methods, as well as novel forms of thinking and doing research. Yet, our 
analysis goes further, showing that differences in mobility strategies are reflected in levels of 
productivity, while also advancing that information exchange practices are a key mechanism that may 
help understand such differences. Similarly, while previous authors (e.g. Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001) 
have found that accessing knowledge across organizational boundaries can have a positive impact on 
outcomes, our work goes beyond and provides a link to individual practices and outcomes, rather than 
posing it as an abstract organizational process. This opens new questions to the literature on further 
exploring the role of individual practices on its contribution to and impact in new knowledge generation.  
Finally, when reflecting on this question, it is important to note that there may be strategic 
reasons for the presence of academically inbred faculty, even if its negative consequences on scientific 
outputs are recognized. In fact, some argue that academic inbreeding is an integrant part of the 
development process of any higher education system. This was first implicitly considered by McGee 
(1960) in his study of the University of Texas in the late 1950s. His conception was that academic 
inbreeding was part of an institutional strategy to overcome geographic and financial handicaps related to 
academic recruitment. According to him, differences in salaries between inbred and non-inbred faculty 
were used as a resource management strategy, positively discriminating non-inbred faculty so that it could 
be competitive in the higher education labor market and attract faculty with higher scholar (and especially 
research) potential. Non-inbred faculty were also given a lower teaching load, which helped them achieve - 22 - 
a higher scientific productivity (the relation between time in teaching and research productivity is taken as 
negative; see Marsh and Hattie, 2002). Thus, they were also more likely to move faster in their career. In 
this context, faculty inbreeding can be associated with university efforts to gain competences when 
departing from a disadvantaged position. Inbreeding in leading research universities can also be present 
and be less damaging to scientific outputs because of their more cosmopolitan environment. Finally, since 
inbred faculty appear to be more engaged in outreach activities, universities may consider their presence 
when interested in promoting this dimension of their activity. Still, they need to realize that there will be a 
trade-off with their scientific outputs.  
6. Conclusions 
The analysis shows that academic inbreeding is detrimental to scientific productivity. Inbred 
faculty produce less articles in reviewed journals than non inbred faculty. Moreover, this finding appears 
to be related with the fact that inbred faculty favor internal exchange of information over external 
exchange of information. This means that, as universities grow the proportion of inbred faculty, there will 
be increasingly less openness and more internal focus. The analysis also shows that at leading research 
oriented universities inbred faculty still produce fewer peer reviewed articles, though the difference is 
smaller than in the complete sample.  
The results suggest that an excessive dependence from inbred talent can easily lead to academic 
fossilization and knowledge atrophy. These are hand in hand with a resistance to the implementation of 
new methods, theories and flexible forms of organization. Universities that rely on this type of human 
resources are more likely to be rigid institutions, because closed groups tend to consolidate and reinforce 
existing social structures over adapting new ones. This is particularly dangerous for the university as an 
organization because rigid structures favoring inertia may unable them from being responsive towards 
society requirements, and therefore, lose legitimacy (Scott, 1995). Any organization that loses legitimacy 
(socially given) places its survival at risk.  
Although not explored in this paper for lack of data (no citation data for the published papers), we 
anticipate that the quality of the scientific outputs produced by inbred faculty may also be lesser when - 23 - 
compared with non-inbred faculty. In fact, previous work demonstrated that inter-institutional 
collaboration, not only impacted scientific productivity but also quality (e.g.: Adams et al., 2005). In any 
case, our analysis strongly asserts that inbreeding recruitment practices are detrimental to the 
development of the university knowledge base and therefore, should be limited or prevented. This leads 
us to assert that a periodical renewing of the faculty core is beneficial and necessary to recycle the 
learning and the organizational structure of the university, both research and teaching oriented. One way 
to undertake such strategy is to provide strong incentives towards mobility related to career progress, as 
well as to promote greater research productivity (e.g.: Dietz and Bozeman, 2005); another is by increasing 
internal competition, which is proved to lead to a valuation and use of external knowledge sources when 
compared to internal knowledge sources (Menon and Pfeffer, 2003).  
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15) 
U n d e r   t h e s i s   ( 1 )   1 . 0 0                 
Master  thesis  (2)  -0.01  1.00               
PhD  thesis  (3)  0.00  0.31  1.00              
Articles peer reviewed journals (4)  0.27  0.02  0.07  1.00             
Prototypes  and  patents  (5)  0.09  0.00  -0.06  -0.10  1.00            
Consulting Contracts (6)  0.03  0.12  0.22  0.03  0.08  1.00           
Research and teaching activities (7)  0.04  0.05  0.08 0.15  -0.08  -0.05 1.00          
Innovative subjects and articles in your field (8)  0.09  0.08  0.05  0.16  -0.11  -0.03  0.70  1.00               
Equipment sources and research techniques  (9)  0.04  0.02  0.02  0.15  -0.10  -0.02  0.64  0.84  1.00             
Financial  sources  for  research  (10)  -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.19  -0.09 0.06 0.60 0.60 0.59 1.00           
Publishing and diffusion research results (11)  -0.04  0.04  0.03  0.09  -0.11  -0.03  0.70  0.72  0.67  0.60  1.00         
Job opportunities (12)  0.11  -0.03 0.14 0.18  -0.11 0.07 0.58 0.58 0.52 0.49 0.54 1.00       
Inbreeding  (13)  0.13 -0.13 -0.06 -0.11  0.11  0.12 -0.15 -0.26 -0.21 -0.18 -0.19 -0.18  1.00    
Years  since  first  contract  (14)  0.07  0.24  0.29 -0.12  0.06  0.22 -0.05  0.10 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04  0.03  0.10  1.00  
Years since first contract squared (15)  0.05  0.19  0.29  -0.14  0.06  0.24 -0.07  0.10 -0.03 -0.07 -0.06 -0.01  0.12  0.96  1.00 
Gender  (male)  (16)  0.10 0.16 0.06 0.19 0.21 0.13 0.04 0.00  -0.03 0.04 0.00  -0.01  -0.03  -0.01  -0.02 
Participate  collective  R&D  project  (17)  0.06 0.04 0.20 0.14  -0.15 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.05  -0.03 0.07  -0.13  -0.12  -0.13 
Funding  for  R&D  last  3  years  (18)  0.20  -0.03 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.01  -0.06  -0.08  -0.09  -0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01 
Taught  undergraduate  only  (19)  -0.02 -0.32 -0.25 -0.16 -0.02 -0.05 -0.10 -0.12 -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.15  0.02 -0.17 -0.15 
Taught  graduate  only  (20)  -0.18 0.10  -0.08  -0.08  -0.06 0.09 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.12  -0.09  -0.03  -0.02 
Average  number  students  taught  (21)  0.12 -0.15 -0.17 -0.04 -0.15 -0.12 -0.12 -0.02 -0.08 -0.12 -0.07 -0.16  0.09 -0.04 -0.08 
Engineering  and  technology  (22)  0.04  0.25 -0.05 -0.07  0.02  0.15 -0.18 -0.23 -0.21 -0.15 -0.19 -0.14 -0.03  0.01  0.02 
Education  and  human  sciences  (23)  -0.04 0.02  -0.01  -0.03 0.02 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.22 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.01 
Social  and  administrative  sciences  (24)  0.04  -0.04  -0.03 0.04  -0.11  -0.03 0.09 0.18 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.14 0.22 
Natural  and  exact  sciences  (25)  -0.09 -0.15 -0.02 -0.02  0.09 -0.14  0.05  0.07  0.09  0.00  0.00  0.01 -0.05 -0.08 -0.15 
Table A1 – Correlation table 
 
  (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)  (25) 
Gender  (male)  (16)  1.00           
Participate  collective  R&D  project  (17)  -0.04  1.00          
Funding  for  R&D  last  3  years  (18) 0.21  0.13  1.00         
Taught  undergraduate  only  (19)  -0.07  -0.03  0.01  1.00        
Taught graduate only (20)  -0.03  -0.02  -0.20  -0.12  1.00           
Average number students taught (21)  -0.14  0.08  0.07  0.07  -0.10  1.00         
Engineering and technology (22)  0.29  -0.26  -0.01  0.06  0.12  -0.21  1.00       
Education  and  human  sciences  (23)  -0.03  0.06 -0.18 -0.09  0.02  0.03 -0.18  1.00    
Social  and  administrative  sciences  (24) -0.19  0.01 -0.08 -0.07  0.00 -0.10 -0.20 -0.14  1.00  
Natural and exact sciences (25)  -0.02  0.11  0.11  0.07  -0.06  0.15  -0.42  -0.30  -0.33  1.00 
Table A1 – Correlation table (continuation) 
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research and 
teaching activities 
innovative subjects or 
published materials 
equipment, sources and 
research techniques 
financial aid for 
research 
publishing and diffusion 
opportunities of research results  Work opportunities 
Inbreeding  -0.344** -0.425***  -0.322**  -0.188*  -0.373***  -0.122 
Years since first contract  0.001  0.001  -0.046  0.012  0.015  0.011 
Years since first contract squared  0.0001  0.0001  0.0007  -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0001 
Male 0.222  0.171  0.328**  0.172  -0.208*  0.195 
Participate collective R&D   0.369  0.325  0.402*  0.315  -0.254  0.595** 
Funding for R&D last 3 years  0.212  0.084  0.041  0.289  0.152  -0.099 
Teaches graduate students only  -0.068 -0.441***  -0.308*  -0.043 -0.248  -0.454** 
Teach undergrad students only  0.614** 0.328  1.279*** 0.600** 0.173  0.320 
Number of students per class  -0.005  -0.004  -0.001  -0.005  -0.008  -0.003 
Engineering and technology  -0.741**  -0.785***  -0.590  -0.544**  -0.299  -0.815*** 
Educational and Human sciences  0.235  -0.002  -0.007  -0.124  0.487**  -0.139 
Social sciences & administration  -0.501  0.0614  0.331*  -0.0189  -0.0352  -0.262 
Natural and exact sciences  -0.001  -0.214  -0.109  -0.324*  -0.087  -0.413* 
hei3 0.965***  -0.769**  -1.710***  -0.366**  0.161  0.282 
hei19  -0.0530  -0.520**  -0.607***  -0.128 -0.231 -0.243 
hei21 0.426**  0.260  -0.460  -0.177*  0.287**  0.398*** 
hei22 2.068***    0.540    1.275***  0.654* 
hei23 0.0651  0.234***  0.310***  0.234***  0.286***  0.438** 
hei42 -0.124  0.0182  -0.184  0.501***  0.624***  0.286 
hei51 0.294**  0.341**  0.0893  0.305***  0.310**  1.251*** 
hei56 0.157  0.556**  0.279  0.231  0.891***  -0.0783 
hei63  1.319***  1.162***  1.500***  0.568*** 1.427*** 1.312*** 
hei68 0.475***  0.360***  0.242**  -0.0327  0.844***  0.00415 
hei75       -0.257**    0.984*** 
hei28 0.501*  0.467*  0.143  0.0710  -0.0410  0.197 
hei84           0.256* 
Constant -1.475***  -0.924*  -0.601  -1.146***  -0.317  -1.195** 
Wald (chi2)  410.56***  728.65***  1362.91***  96.61***  140.08***  6210.77*** 
Observations  291  267  262  263 260 247 
Table A2 – Regression for The information exchange hypothesis (heiXX represent individual university controls) 
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  Supervision of 
undergrad thesis 
Supervision 
of master 
thesis 
Supervision 
of PhD Thesis 
Articles in 
peer review 
journals 
Consultancy 
(gov. or firms) 
Prototypes 
and patents 
Inbreeding  -0.021 -0.074  0.096  -0.150**  1.007***  0.749*** 
Years since first contract  0.026  0.051***  -0.013  -0.020*  0.057  -0.099 
Years since first contract squared -0.001*  -0.001**  0.001  0.0002  -0.0001  0.003** 
Male  0.009  0.311*** 0.176 0.155*** 0.842* 1.262*** 
Participate collective R&D project  0.126  0.411  0.752***  0.266***  0.612*  -0.138 
Funding for R&D last 3 years  0.055  0.047  0.589**  0.242***  -0.371  0.879** 
Teaches graduate students only  -0.115  -0.718*** -0.960*** -0.267*** 0.468  -0.020 
Teaches undergraduate students 
only  -0.028 0.479**  -0.233  -0.132 0.515 -0.252 
Average number of students per 
class  0.009 -0.004  -0.013***  0.001  0.007  -0.020 
Engineering and technology  0.338***  0.027  -0.529**  -0.463***  1.576***  -0.031 
Educational and Human sciences  0.172  -0.149  -0.384  -0.152  0.733  -0.194 
Social sciences and administration  0.566***  -0.241  -0.374  -0.150  1.418***  -1.401*** 
Natural and exact sciences  -0.142  -0.430***  -0.569**  -0.213**  0.162  0.287 
hei3 -2.171***  0.465***  -0.176  0.255*  -0.973  -14.050*** 
hei19 0.053  -0.112  0.367***  0.295***  -0.263  -14.560*** 
hei21 0.159*  0.117  -0.577***  -0.016  -0.974***  -1.0340*** 
hei22 -1.593***  0.001  -0.513**  -0.778***  -0.765  -13.520*** 
hei23 -0.056  0.044  0.193***  0.135***  -1.488***  0.614*** 
hei28 -0.316***  -0.318**  -0.644***  -0.536***  0.177  -14.100*** 
hei42 0.040  0.050  -1.607***  -0.456***  -1.047***  0.789*** 
hei51 0.251***  -1.038***  -0.334***  0.008  -0.877***  0.979*** 
hei56 -1.061***  0.085  -0.745***  -1.337***  -0.427  1.102*** 
hei63 0.170  -0.045  -0.967***  0.008  -0.070  0.179 
hei68 0.377***  -0.070  -0.958***  0.035  1.228***  -15.11*** 
hei75 0.472***  0.321***  0.188  -0.502***  2.249***  0.784** 
hei84 0.312***  -0.149**  -19.29***  0.989***  -17.67***  -14.57*** 
Constant -0.032  -0.513  -0.904  1.191***  -4.746***  -3.214*** 
Wald (chi2)  5.0e+05***  1669.61***  1309.50*** 7.2e+05*** 4410.69*** 5.8e+08*** 
Observations  366  366 366 366 366 366 
Table A3 – Regression for The productivity hypothesis (heiXX represent individual university controls) 
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  Supervision of 
undergrad thesis 
Supervision of 
master thesis 
Supervision of 
PhD Thesis 
Articles in 
peer review 
journals 
Consultancy 
(gov. or firms) 
Prototypes 
and patents 
Inbreeding  -0.003 -0.078  0.206  -0.189*  1.435***  0.933 
Years since first contract  0.016  0.065  0.033  -0.018  0.051  -0.187 
Years since first contract squared -0.0003  -0.0010  -0.0002  0.0003  0.0004  0.005** 
Male 0.024  0.310*  0.341  0.136  1.656***  1.286 
Participate collective R&D project  0.229  0.845***  0.802**  0.452*  0.745  -0.595 
Funding for R&D last 3 years  0.392  0.091  0.891***  0.212  -0.141  0.078 
Teaches graduate students only  -0.653** -0.560* -0.429  -0.537*** 1.333**  0.421 
Teaches undergraduate students 
only  0.486 0.552**  0.882 0.123  1.817***  1.839 
Average number of students per 
class  0.0141** 0.0007 -0.0104 0.0002 0.0043  -0.002 
Engineering and technology  0.463*  0.0362  -0.818**  -0.457**  2.729***  -1.125 
Educational and Human sciences  -0.106  -0.116  -0.099  -0.330  1.722*  0.792 
Social sciences and administration  0.569**  -0.194  0.036  -0.205  2.224***  -2.565 
Natural and exact sciences  0.178  -0.449**  -0.399  -0.118  1.636**  0.296 
Constant -0.445  -1.243**  -2.096***  0.988***  -7.466***  -2.300 
Wald  (chi2)  21.19*  56.53*** 49.30*** 34.55*** 75.22***  15.35 
Observations  142  142 142 142 142 142 
Table A4 – Regression for The research oriented university effect hypothesis (UNAM analysis) 
 
 